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Introduction 
 
 This model is intended to describe the essential relationships between the demand for and 
supply of education and the demand for and supply of educated workers. The terms "education" 
and "training" will be used interchangeably throughout, since the proposed model is a general 
one designed to apply both to traditional education and to specialized training for such 
occupations as agricultural and veterinary workers, teachers, the skilled trades, and the like. The 
terms "educated," "trained," and "skilled" will also be used synonymously. 
 If the model is to be meaningful, it must possess two basic characteristics. First, it must 
be consistent with the historical facts of labor surplus economies. Second, it must suggest 
qualitative, and hopefully quantitative, factors to be considered by policy-makers in formulating 
educational and labor market policies consistent with national objectives. 
 Work of this nature must progress through three definite phases. First is the formulation 
of the model. Next comes the solution of the model, which is used to describe the historical time 
paths of interesting magnitudes and to suggest optimal paths for the control variables for 
planning purposes. Finally, as much empirical evidence as possible is needed to make the study 
operationally meaningful for planners. 
 This paper is a slight modification of Staff Paper No. 88, Institute for Development 
Studies, University of Nairobi, November, 1970. The author wishes to thank the Rockefeller 
Foundation and the Center for Research on Economic Development, University of Michigan, for 
financing his stay in Kenya. He would also like to thank the Institute for Development Studies 
for providing a congenial research environment. 
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 I am here concerned only with phase one: a statement of the model. I hope to formulate 
the basic relationships, including the essential institutional facts of life. As will become evident, 
such an exercise leads to a conceptually straightforward but mathematically complex model. An 
analytical solution may prove to be impossible. Perhaps computer simulations of the basic 
relationships are all that can be found. In any event, a clear statement of the model is a 
prerequisite for further study. 
 
A General Description of the Model 
 
 There are in fact two models. In the historical model, no optimal behavior is postulated to 
have occurred; society is not assumed to have been maximizing national income, social welfare, 
or anything else. Rather, the course of the economy and the educational system are assumed to 
have been determined by the interaction of the endogenous responses of individuals and 
communities to such variables as the demand for and supply of training facilities and workers of 
different skill categories. It is assumed that the labor surplus economy was initially in 
disequilibrium characterized by an excess demand for education. The solution of the historical 
model, if one exists, is an equation that defines historical time paths of important labor market 
and educational variables as the economy adjusts toward equilibrium. This equation can also be 
used to project the future course of the economy and the eventual equilibrium if the existing 
relationships are assumed to hold indefinitely. If, however, the supply of schooling facilities is 
controlled by the government for the purpose of maximizing social welfare, then it may be 
possible to solve the planning model for an optimal path of the supply of schooling facilities. The 
solution, if one exists, will allow the calculation of the time paths of such magnitudes as the total 
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supply of training spaces, the fraction of the labor force that is trained, the employment rate, and 
the national income. 
 
The Historical Model 
 
 The model assumes that there are two categories of labor, educated and uneducated; two 
types of jobs, skilled and unskilled; and one produced good with a numéraire price of one. The 
aggregate level of output depends upon the employment of these two types of labor and upon the 
quantity of capital and a disembodied level of technology, both of which are assumed to grow 
exogenously and are neutral with respect to the two categories of labor. The number of new 
entrants to the labor force is assumed to grow exogenously, and a constant exogenous fraction of 
the existing labor force is assumed to drop out due to death or retirement. It is assumed that the 
aggregate production function is homogeneous of degree less than one, which implies 
diminishing returns to scale and a linear expansion path. 
 Uneducated workers can work only in unskilled jobs. Educated workers can choose to 
work in skilled or unskilled jobs. Their choice is assumed to depend, on the margin, upon the 
wage rates and probabilities of employment in skilled and unskilled jobs. 
 Education can be acquired instantaneously, but there may be a positive money cost to the 
trainee. It is assumed that the only persons eligible to receive training are new entrants to the 
labor force; adult education is ruled out. The number of new entrants who demand education is 
assumed to depend on the margin, upon the wage rates, and upon the probabilities of 
employment in skilled and unskilled jobs. This decision is assumed to be as rational as possible 
in a world of incomplete information. 
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 The supply of educational spaces has two components: central government facilities and 
community-financed facilities. In the historical model, both supplies are endogenous, depending 
on the difference between total demand and total supply. Since central governments in labor 
surplus economies command far greater resources than localities, it is assumed that endogenous 
responses of central governments are much quicker. 
 The dynamics of the labor market must reflect institutional realities. For simplicity, 
wages for skilled and unskilled jobs are assumed to have grown at the same constant exogenous 
rate, so that the percentage wage differential remains constant. These wages are assumed always 
to lie above the market-clearing wage. Workers are employed until the marginal product of the 
last worker hired equals the wage. Consequently, there will always be unemployment. 
It is assumed that, once a worker obtains a job, that job is his for life. Furthermore, employers 
hire according to educational attainment, so that educated workers in the unskilled labor market 
are hired first. In the relevant range, it is assumed that educated workers can immediately obtain 
an unskilled job for life. Within a skill category, the labor market operates completely randomly, 
so that the probability of obtaining a job is the ratio of hires to job-seekers. Implicitly, this 
assumes that there are no vintage effects and therefore that workers trained today are identical 
with workers trained earlier, skills do not depreciate with disuse or appreciate with experience, 
older workers are not discriminated against due to a shorter expected lifetime on the job, 
technical change is disembodied, and there are no quality or ability differences within a skill 
category. 
 The social cost of education is equal to the quantity of resources devoted to the 
maintenance and operation of the education establishment. No output is forgone as a result of 
having a smaller labor force since training occurs instantaneously. Consumption is defined as the 
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difference between output and the social cost of training. Social welfare is presumed to depend 
positively on consumption, the employment rate, and the fraction of the labor force that has 
training. Since these arguments are determined by the model, social welfare is determined 
implicitly once the values of all other magnitudes are known. 
 
The Planning Model 
 
 The planning model is identical with the historical model, except that the supply of 
government schooling facilities no longer follows a fixed endogenous relationship but rather is 
under the control of the government. It is the objective of the government to maximize social 
utility, defined as the present value of future social welfare, by appropriate choice of the control 
variable. The time paths of all other magnitudes are determined implicitly from the social 
welfare and government training facility time paths. 
 
A Formal Statement of the Model 
 
 The factors of production are capital and two categories of labor, skilled and unskilled. 
The quantity of capital available to the economy is determined exogenously. Aggregate output is 
given by the production function 
𝑄 = 𝑄(𝐸𝑢𝑢 + 𝑝𝑒𝑢
𝐸 , 𝐸𝑒𝑠)𝑒
𝜃𝑡, 𝑝 > 1 
where 𝐸𝑢𝑢 and 𝐸𝑒𝑢 are respectively the employment of uneducated and educated workers in 
unskilled jobs, 𝑝 is an index of productivity of 𝐸𝑒𝑢 relative to 𝐸𝑢𝑢, 𝐸𝑒𝑠 is the employment of 
educated workers in skilled jobs, and 𝜃 is an index of the technological level of the economy, 
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including capital utilization. Technical change and capital use are neutral with respect to the 
different categories of labor. The production function is assumed to be homogeneous of degree 
less than one, or 
𝑄(𝑐𝐸𝑢𝑢 + 𝑐𝑝𝐸𝑒𝑢, 𝑐𝐸𝑒𝑠)𝑒
𝜃𝑡 = 𝑐𝑘(𝐸𝑢𝑢 + 𝑝𝐸𝑒𝑢, 𝐸𝑒𝑠)𝑒
𝜃𝑡, 𝑘 > 1, 
where 𝑐 is a scale factor. The fact that 𝜃 < 𝑘 < 1 implies that there are diminishing returns to 
scale of employment in skilled and unskilled jobs. The homogeneity of the production function 
ensures a linear expansion path.** 
 
Wage and Employment Determination 
 
 Wages for both groups of workers are set exogenously above the market-clearing rate. 
The unskilled wage (𝑊𝑢) is always equal to some fraction 𝛼 of the skilled wage (𝑊𝑠).
*** The 
unskilled wage and the skilled wage are both assumed to be growing at the same constant rate 
(𝑤). Educated and uneducated workers are employed in skilled and unskilled jobs respectively 
until the point where the wage for each is equal to the respective marginal product, 𝑄𝐸𝑒𝑠 and 
𝑄𝐸𝑢𝑢. The wage for a worker in an unskilled job is assumed to be the Maine whether or not the 
worker is educated. Since educated workers are p times more productive in unskilled jobs and 
are available at the same wage, they are naturally preferred by employers, and employers hire as 
many educated workers as they can for unskilled jobs. These relations may be expressed 
algebraically as 
                                                          
 An index of all symbols used in this paper can be found on the last page. 
** See for instance J. M. Henderson and R. E. Quandt, Microeconomic Theory: A Mathematical 
Approach (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971) for a proof of this assertion. 
*** Throughout this discussion, a bar (-) over a variable denotes that it is set by public policy, a 
hat (Λ) denotes a rate of growth, and a dot (.) denotes a time derivative. 
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𝑤𝑢 = ?̅?𝑢, 𝑤𝑠 = ?̅?𝑠, 𝑤𝑢 = 𝛼𝑤𝑠, 𝛼 < 1 
?̂?𝑢 = ?̂?𝑠 = 𝑤 
𝑤𝑢 = 𝑄𝐸𝑢𝑢 , 𝑤𝑠 = 𝑄𝐸𝑒𝑠  
𝐸𝑒𝑢 = 𝐿𝑒𝑢 
 
Labor Force 
 
 The total labor force (𝐿) is assumed to grow at some exogenous constant rate (𝜆 − 𝛿) 
where 𝜆 is the gross addition rate and 𝛿 the gross dropout rate due to death or retirement. At any 
point in time, the labor force is composed of three groups: uneducated workers working or 
seeking work in unskilled jobs (𝐿𝑢𝑢), educated workers working or seeking work in skilled jobs 
(𝐿𝑒𝑠), and educated workers working in unskilled jobs (𝐿𝑒𝑢). 
𝐿 = 𝐿𝑢𝑢 + 𝐿𝑒𝑠 + 𝐿𝑒𝑢 
 Of these workers, the number employed in skilled jobs is 𝐸𝑠 and the number employed in 
unskilled jobs is 𝐸𝑢. 
 Uneducated workers can work only in unskilled jobs. Educated workers, however, can 
choose between skilled and unskilled jobs, for which they are overqualified. Since it is assumed 
that a worker never loses a job he holds, no educated worker who already holds a high-paying 
skilled job will be interested in a lower-paying unskilled job.* However, potential members of 
                                                          
* Nonpecuniary preference for the unskilled job will not motivate a skilled worker to move. 
Assuming that the nonpecuniary benefits of the job are constant over time, such a worker has 
already revealed his preference for an uncertain skilled job to an unskilled job with certainty. 
Once he has a certain skilled job, he can now prefer the unskilled job only if uncertainty is 
preferred to certainty to such an extent that it outweighs the gain in utility from higher expected 
income. I assume this is not the case. 
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the unskilled work force include the newly educated (𝑆𝑒), old educated workers who are 
currently unemployed (𝐿𝑒𝑠 − 𝐸𝑒𝑠), and educated workers working in unskilled jobs (𝐿𝑒𝑢), all of 
whom are free to choose between an unskilled job with certainty and a chance at a skilled job 
without certainty. 
 It is hypothesized that, at any point in time, the net change in the number of educated 
workers working in unskilled jobs (𝐿𝑒𝑢) is some fraction 𝛽 of the potential number of 
overqualified workers minus the number who die or drop out of the labor force. This relation 
may be expressed as 
𝐿𝑒𝑢 = 𝛽{𝑠𝑒 + (𝐿𝑒𝑠 − 𝐸𝑒𝑠) + 𝐿𝑒𝑢} − 𝛿𝐿𝑒𝑢 
𝛽 is a fraction between −1 and +1 and is a negative function of the percentage difference 
between the present value of expected future income from an uncertain skilled job (𝑉𝑒𝑠 ∗) as 
compared with a certain unskilled job (𝑉𝑒𝑢 ∗). That is, 
𝛽 = 𝛽(𝑉𝑒𝑠 ∗ −𝑉𝑒𝑢 ∗ 𝑉𝑒𝑠 ∗⁄ ), −1 < 𝛽 < 1. 
Figure 7.1 illustrates the hypothesized shape of this function. 
 
 
Insert Figure 1 
 
 
𝛾 is the fraction of potential overqualified workers who would choose unskilled jobs if the 
expected incomes were identical. 
 At any point in time, the number of educated workers in the skilled labor force is the 
original number plus the total number trained, minus those who have dropped out of the labor 
force and minus the gross number who have entered the unskilled labor force. This may be 
expressed as 
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𝐿𝑒𝑠 = 𝐿𝑠(0) + ∫ 𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑡 −
𝑡
0
∫ 𝛿𝐿𝑒𝑠𝑑𝑡 − ∫(𝐿𝑒𝑢 + 𝛿𝐿𝑒𝑢)𝑑𝑡.
𝑡
0
𝑡
0
 
Differentiating (10) with respect to time gives the net change in the number of educated workers 
in the skilled labor force at any point in time: 
?̇?𝑒𝑠 = 𝑠𝑒 − 𝛿𝐿𝑒𝑠 − (?̇?𝑒𝑢 + 𝛿𝐿𝑒𝑢). 
That is, the change in the number of educated workers in the skilled labor force is the number of 
new school-leavers minus the number who drop out of the labor force less the gross number who 
enter the unskilled labor force. 
 
Demand for Education 
 
 Education is demanded by individuals who respond to private costs and benefits. To the 
extent that education is demanded by society, this is reflected in the supply of government 
schooling facilities. 
 At any point in time, the number of new entrants to the labor force is 𝜆𝐿. The fraction of 
new entrants who-demand education (𝐷𝑒 𝜆𝐿⁄ ) is some positive function of the present value of 
the expected percentage income differential of educated workers as compared to uneducated, or 
(𝐷𝑒 𝜆𝐿⁄ ) = Ψ(𝑉𝑒 ∗ −𝑉𝑢 ∗ 𝑉𝑢 ∗⁄ ) 
 
 
Insert Figure 2 
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𝜖 is the fraction of new entrants who would demand education if the expected present values 
were indentical. 
 
Supply of Education 
 
 The total supply of schooling spaces (𝑆𝑒) is the sum of the central government supply 
(𝑆𝑒𝐺) and the local community supply (𝑆𝑒𝐶) 
𝑆𝑒 = 𝑆𝑒𝐺 + 𝑆𝑒𝐶 ∗ 
Both the government supply and community supply depend on the difference between total 
demand and total supply. At any point in time, the number of new community spaces being built 
is some fraction 𝜂 of the difference between demand and supply 
?̇?𝑒𝑐 = 𝜂{𝐷𝑒 − 𝑆𝑒}, 0 < 𝜂 < 1 
and the number of new government spaces being built is some fraction 𝜇 
𝑆𝑒𝐺 = 𝜇{𝐷𝑒 − 𝑆𝑒}, 0 < 𝜇 < 1. 
Ordinarily, 𝜇 is larger than 𝜂, reflecting the greater availability of resources to the central 
government. The numbers 𝜇 and 𝜂 are coefficients of adjustment and vary positively with 
society's taste for education, positively with the level of income, positively with the private rate 
of return to education, and negatively with the cost of constructing and operating schools. 𝜂 
varies positively and 𝜇 negatively with the amount of subsidies granted by the central 
                                                          
* The symbol 𝑆𝑒 is used for both supply of education and the number of students. This assumes 
that demand for training always exceeds the supply, so that school facilities are always fully 
utilized. There is probably a strong ratchet that prevents the closing of existing facilities. The 
model is proposed only for labor surplus economies in which a situation of excess demand for 
education will prevail until equilibrium. 
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government to communities for the construction and operation of schools and 𝜇 varies negatively 
with the amount of the bursaries granted to students by the central government. 
 (14) and (15) can be combined to give 
?̇?𝑒 = (𝜂 + 𝜇){𝐷𝑒 − 𝑆𝑒}. 
 In order to avoid cycles of overbuilding, closing of facilities, and so on, it is assumed that 
(𝜂 + 𝜇) < 1 
 
Labor Market Dynamics 
 
 As noted previously, it is assumed that, once a worker obtains a job, that job is his for 
life. Therefore, hiring takes place for two purposes: net employment creation and replacement of 
labor force dropouts. Educated workers are hired preferentially for unskilled jobs. This may 
either be because educated workers are more productive than uneducated workers or because 
employers prefer better-educated workers ceteris paribus. All workers within a skill category are 
homogeneous, and the labor market operates randomly. 
 Looking first at the market for unskilled jobs, the number of uneducated workers hired is 
the difference between total unskilled hires and gross hires of educated workers. The total 
number of unskilled hires is the number of new unskilled jobs available (?̇?𝑢) plus the 
replacement demand, 𝛿(𝐸𝑢𝑢 + 𝐸𝑒𝑢), minus the gross hires of educated workers for unskilled 
jobs, (?̇?𝑒𝑢 + 𝛿𝐿𝑒𝑢). We assume that there will be fewer educated job-seekers in the unskilled 
market than there are unskilled jobs, so that all educated job-seekers in the unskilled market are 
immediately employed. Therefore, 𝐸𝑒𝑢 = 𝐿𝑒𝑢, and the number of uneducated workers being 
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hired is (?̇?𝑢 + 𝛿𝐸𝑢𝑢 − ?̇?𝑒𝑢). The number of uneducated job-seekers is the number unemployed 
(𝐿𝑢𝑢 − 𝐸𝑢𝑢) Thus, the probability of an unemployed uneducated worker becoming employed is 
𝑃𝑢 =
?̇?𝑢 + 𝛿𝐸𝑢𝑢 − ?̇?𝑒𝑢
𝐿𝑢𝑢 − 𝐸𝑢𝑢
 
 At any point in time, the cohort deciding whether or not to demand education is assumed 
to have accurate knowledge only of the current labor market situation. It is further assumed that 
the individual takes the current probability of gaining employment and projects that probability 
into the future. On the basis of such a calculation, the change in the projected probability of 
being employed for an uneducated worker is today's probability of becoming employed projected 
into the future multiplied by the projected probability of being unemployed, or 
?̇?𝑢
∗ = 𝑃𝑢
∗(1 − 𝜙𝑢
∗), 
where the *’s denote projections based on current figures rather than the unknown actual 
probabilities. Solving this differential equation yields an expected probability of being employed 
𝜙𝑢
∗ = 1 − 𝑒−𝑃𝑢∗𝑡 
 Turning now to the market for skilled jobs, the analysis is similar. The number of new 
hires is replacement demand (𝛿𝐸𝑒𝑠) plus new jobs (?̇?𝑆). The number of job-seekers is the 
educated labor force in the skilled market (𝐿𝑒𝑠) minus the number employed (𝐸𝑒𝑠). Therefore, 
𝑃𝑆 =
?̇?𝑆 + 𝛿𝐸𝑒𝑠
𝐿𝑒𝑠 − 𝐸𝑒𝑠
 
As above, 
?̇?𝑠
∗ = 𝑃𝑠 ∗ (1 − 𝜙𝑠
∗), 
which solves to 
𝜙𝑠
∗ = 1 − 𝑒−𝑃𝑠∗𝑡 
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These projected probabilities of employment, 𝜙𝑢
∗  and 𝜙𝑠
∗, are used in the calculation of expected 
present values of various alternatives. 
 
Expected Present Values 
 
 The expected present value of future income for an uneducated worker is 
𝑉𝑢 ∗= ∫ 𝑊𝑢(𝑡)
∞
0
𝜙𝑢
∗(𝑡){1 − ∆(𝑡)}𝑒−𝑟𝑡𝑑𝑡. 
∆(𝑡) is the probability of having died or dropped out of the labor force at time 𝑡; {1 − ∆(𝑡)} is 
the probability of being in the labor force, 𝑟 is the discount rate. Substituting and integrating, this 
solves to 
𝑉𝑢 ∗= 𝑊𝑢(0)
−𝑃𝑢 ∗
(𝑤 − 𝛿 − 𝑟)(𝑤 − 𝛿 − 𝑟−𝑃𝑢 ∗)
 
The expected present value of future income for an educated worker is the present value of 
expected income if he is educated less the present value of the private costs of education. The 
present value of expected lifetime income for an educated worker (𝑉𝑒 ∗) is the expected value of 
lifetime income if he works in a skilled job (𝑉𝑒𝑠 ∗) times the expected probability of working in a 
skilled job plus the expected value of lifetime income if he works in an unskilled job times the 
expected probability of working in an unskilled job. The fraction of skilled workers choosing to 
work in unskilled jobs is 𝛽. (See equation (9).) Therefore, the expected present value of future 
income for an educated worker is 
𝑉𝑒 ∗= −𝑃𝐶𝑒 + (1 − 𝛽)𝑉𝑒𝑠 ∗ +𝛽𝑉𝑒𝑢 ∗ ,   where 
𝑉𝑒𝑠 ∗= 𝑊𝑠(0)
−𝑃𝑠 ∗
(𝑤 − 𝛿 − 𝑟)(𝑤 − 𝛿 − 𝑟−𝑃𝑠 ∗)
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and   𝑉𝑒𝑢 ∗= 𝑊𝑢(0)
1
(𝑤 − 𝛿 − 𝑟)
 
and 𝑃𝐶𝑒 is the present value of the private cost of education. 
 
Social Welfare Function 
 
 The social welfare (𝑆𝑊) is a positive function of consumption, the employment rate, and 
the fraction of the labor force that is educated: 
𝑆𝑊 = 𝑓(𝐶, 𝐸/𝐿, 𝐿𝑒/𝐿) 
Consumption is the difference between aggregate output 𝑄 and the resources used in producing 
education (𝑐𝑆𝑒), where 𝑐 is the unit cost of educating an individual and 𝑆𝑒 is the total number 
being educated: 
𝐶 == 𝑄 − 𝑐𝑆𝑒 
Social welfare is determined after all other magnitudes in the system. 
 
The Social Utility Function 
 
 Social utility (U) is simply the present discounted value of future social welfare 
𝑈 = ∫ 𝑆𝑊(𝑡)𝑒−𝑟𝑡𝑑𝑡
∞
0
 
taking the current time as time zero. Care should be exercised to avoid confusing the time origin 
for the historical model (independence or some other arbitrary date) with the time origin for the 
planning model (the present). Bearing this change of time origin in mind, the planning model and 
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historical models are formally identical except that the adjustment function for central 
government schooling spaces, equation (15), is replaced by 
 (15’) Se is controlled in order to maximize U as given by (31). Equation (16) and relation 
(17) are in this case no longer relevant and should be dropped. 
 
Thoughts on Simplification 
 
 At the cost of less realism, the model can be simplified in order to isolate the time paths 
of the educational and labor market variables. Essentially, these simplifications hold the 
aggregate size of the economy constant, thereby isolating the variables of greatest interest. 
 The size of the labor force can be held constant by equating the gross addition rate 𝜆 to 
the gross withdrawal rate 𝛿. The constant labor force has the advantage of focusing attention on 
time derivatives without worrying about rates of growth. 
 Another simplification is to hold output constant. If 𝜃, the combined effect of neutral 
capital utilization and disembodied technical change, is zero, and, if educated workers are no 
more productive in unskilled jobs than uneducated workers, i.e., 𝑝 = 0, then changes in output 
can result only from changes in the quantity of labor employed. If the rate of growth of wages, 
𝑤, is set equal to zero, then marginal products remain constant, so total employment will be 
unchanged. 
 This is perhaps an extreme model, since there is no economic motivation for additional 
education. If a greater share of the labor force becomes educated, society gains no extra output 
and in fact sacrifices a greater share of its resources in order to educate its young. There remain 
two possible noneconomic motivations for an expanding educational sector. First, society may 
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derive a sufficient gain in social welfare from having a larger fraction of its populace educated to 
compensate for reduced consumption of other things. Second, private demands may perpetuate a 
cycle in which a greater fraction of new entrants are educated and the probability of an 
uneducated entrant obtaining a job becomes smaller, so the private demand increases, supply 
increases in partial response to demand, and the cycle continues ad infinitum. Thus, although 
total employment would remain the same, the educational composition of the labor force would 
be changing. The interesting questions are under what circumstances this cycle would occur and 
how should government control the supply of schooling in order to maximize social utility. 
 An alternative extreme model is one that ignores the private demand for education, 
ignores any gain in social utility from greater education, and considers only economically 
motivated social demand. In this case, it may be assumed that output would rise, the greater the 
number of workers in unskilled jobs who are educated. Such a model would effectively treat the 
growth of community self-help schools as unexplainable and would evaluate the social cost of 
the resources expended on community schools as zero, assuming that these resources are 
supplied only for the purpose of constructing and operating such a school and would not be 
supplied otherwise. The interesting questions again are under what circumstances the supply of 
schooling would increase and how should government control the supply in order to maximize 
social utility. 
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Notation 
 
C Aggregate consumption 
𝐷𝑒 Demand for education 
E Aggregate employment 
𝐸𝑠 Employment in skilled jobs 
𝐸𝑢 Employment in unskilled jobs 
𝐸𝑒𝑠 Employment of educated workers in skilled jobs 
𝐸𝑒𝑢 Employment of educated workers in unskilled jobs 
𝐸𝑢𝑢 Employment of uneducated workers in unskilled jobs 
L Total labor force 
𝐿𝑠 Labor force for skilled jobs 
𝐿𝑢 Labor force for unskilled jobs 
𝐿𝑒𝑠 Educated workers in labor force for skilled jobs 
𝐿𝑒𝑢 Educated workers in labor force for unskilled jobs 
𝐿𝑢𝑢 Uneducated workers in labor force for unskilled jobs 
𝑃𝑠 Probability of a skilled worker's becoming employed 
𝑃𝑠 ∗ Expected probability of an unemployed skilled worker's becoming employed in 
the future 
𝑃𝑢 Probability of an uneducated worker's becoming employed 
𝑃𝑢 ∗ Expected probability of an unemployed unskilled worker's becoming employed 
in the future 
𝑃𝐶𝑒 Present value of private costs of education 
Q Aggregate output 
𝑄𝐸𝑒𝑠 Marginal product of educated worker in a skilled job 
𝑄𝐸𝑢𝑢 Marginal product of an uneducated worker in an unskilled job 
𝑆𝑒 Total supply of educational facilities 
𝑆𝑒𝑐 Supply of community-financed education 
𝑆𝑒𝑔 Supply of government-financed education 
SW Social welfare 
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U Social utility 
𝑉𝑒 ∗ Expected present value of future income of an educated worker 
𝑉𝑒𝑠 ∗ Expected present value of future income of an educated worker 
in a skilled job 
𝑉𝑒𝑢 ∗ Expected present value of future income of an educated worker in an unskilled 
job 
𝑉𝑢 ∗ Expected present value of future income of (unemployed) uneducated worker 
𝑊𝑠 Wage rate for workers in skilled jobs 
𝑊𝑢 Wage rate for workers in unskilled jobs 
c Per pupil resource cost of education 
k Degree of homogeneity of the production function 
p Productivity of educated worker working in an unskilled job 
relative to an uneducated worker in that same job 
r Discount rate, both private and social 
t Time 
w Rate of growth of wages 
𝛼 Ratio of unskilled wage to skilled wage 
𝛽 Fraction of educated workers not presently employed in 
skilled jobs who choose to work in the unskilled labor force 
𝛾 𝛽(0)  
𝛿 Probability of dying or retiring from the labor force 
Δ Probability of being already dead or retired from the labor force 
𝜖 Ψ(0)  
𝜂 Coefficient of adjustment for community schools 
𝜆 Gross addition rate to labor force 
𝜇 Coefficient of adjustment for government schools 
𝜃 Index of level of technology and capital utilization 
𝜙𝑠 ∗ Expected probability of an unemployed skilled worker's being employed in the 
future 
𝜙𝑢 ∗ Expected probability of an unemployed unskilled worker's being employed in 
the future  
Ψ Education demand function 
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Figure 1 
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